The purpose of the personality rights guaranteed by the Swiss federal constitution and civil law is the same: it lies in safeguarding the autonomy and the self-determination of individuals and thereby the constitutionally guaranteed right to human dignity. The decisive factor for a legal assessment of the protection afforded by the two systems of protection is the potential harm to a persons personality rights.[1] I will therefore focus on the questions of how private and public bodies can violate a persons personality, what factors distinguish these violations, the legal interests involved in each of these cases and the legal responsibility resulting therefrom.


PDF: DOI 10.5281/zenodo.1436387
The original german version can be found here.


1. Structure and protection

Similarity in regulatory structures and common goals

[1] The constitutional and the civil-law protection of personality show several similarities in their respective regulatory structure, as can be shown in the following points.

  • Both areas have developed historically evolved protected assets (Schutzgüter), reflecting an ongoing adaptation to specific threat constellations.
  • Both are based on a common value system[2] and pursue "common goals".[3]
  • Both are a concretisation and thus an expression of the constitutional right of human dignity,[4] are structures as not conclusively determined legal principles[5] and are therefore open to further development. The protection is afforded to each person as a person (Existenzsicherung) as well as the person they are/want to be (Entfaltungsmöglichkeit).[6]
  • Due to their common roots in the constitutional guarantee of human dignity, as well as the core content guarantee (Kerngehaltsgarantie) in Art. 36 para. 4 of the Swiss constitution (Bundesverfassung; BV) and the explicit clauses pertaining to the legal effectiveness of the fundamental rights in Art. 35 BV, both legal complexes must be designed in such a way as to effectively protect the forum internum, the "core areas of private life".[7]

[2] One obvious explanation for this parallel legal development lies in the different origins and protection: the civil right of personality is directed against violations by natural and legal persons of civil law, the constitutional protection, however, against violations by state authorities and by persons performing public functions in the sense of Art. 35 para. 2 BV (see below, para. 14 ff.). It seems logical that these different conditions came and come with different sets of power, interest and legal constellations. Correspondingly, different threats have been realised to which the law must give a differentiated, appropriate response. In the course of time, two similar but independent complexes of norms have developed, each of which embodies its own form of constitutionally secured protection of personality.

Expression in civil law

[3] In Swiss civil law, the core of personality rights is primarily expressed through the idea of equivalent legal capacity, which everyone is entitled to. According to the original conception of the legislature, this means that "the traditional differences of the persons are rejected in principle and the retained differences are presented as exceptions."[8] The original idea was therefore to concretise equality protection in the state's legal assessment of civil law issues.

[4] In addition there are the "protected goods" (Schutzgüter) developed over the course of time by doctrine and jurisprudence, which are commonly referred to as what can be translated as personality goods (Persönlichkeitsgüter). Specifically, they concern the protection of physical integrity, physical freedom of movement, sexual integrity, emotional personality (protection from physical pain and disfigurement, marital and family relationships, piety, identity), honour, the economic personality as well as the informational privacy.[9] The "parenthesis" that holds all personality goods together is that of "personal closeness" (Personennähe)[10] As shown in para. 10, this can also be understood as the "distance" to the object of protection of human dignity.

[5] The primary reference value of these legal goods is the fundamental equivalence of legal subjects in the context of civil law as mentioned in para. 3. The hefty legal weight flowing from this connection to a fundamental value of the constitutional state[11] obliges the state authorities to take measures to ensure effective protection of rights where such equivalence between parties is not present in actual circumstance.[12] This can be due to the relationship between the parties or to the legal transactions that they have concluded.[13] Behind the concept of legal personality we therefore find the recognition and safeguarding by civil law of the fundamental equivalence of legal subjects - closely linked to the guarantee of human dignity as the most important fundamental right in the Swiss Federal Constitution,[14] whose constitutional value is thus translated into civil law.[15]

Expression in constitutional law

[6] The protection of personality in Swiss constitutional law[16] includes the "right to personal freedom" in Article 10 paragraph 2 BV, securing the protection of "fundamental aspects of human existence". The general guarantee of protection has a subsidiary legal effect to the specific fundamental rights provisions of the constitutional protection of personality, i.e. the right to life (Article 10 (1) BV), the prohibition of torture (Article 10 (3) BV), the right to privacy (Article 13 (1) BV) as well as the aspects of other fundamental rights pertaining to the protection of personality.[17] The value of reference is the protection of human dignity as well as the necessary freedoms for its realisation towards the state institutions as well as towards third parties.

Short recap

[7] To sum up, it can be concluded that there are two closely related legal complexes that have a common root and that show a parallel but different development due to the differing quality of the respective historical threats[18]. The mechanism of protection at work here is the constitutionally based assessment of legal decisions, whether directly (in cases of interference by government agencies) or indirectly (in cases of impairment by private individuals). In envisaging the determining factors for the level of protection afforded by civil or constitutional personality, the significance of autonomy in the legal constellation in question, the personal closeness or "distance" to human dignity of the legal interests involved, the degree of power of disposition over these legal interests afforded to the parties as well as the responsibility for the other party are considered.

2. Determining factors of the level of protection of personality rights

First factor: the weighting of legally guaranteed autonomy

[8] To Swiss civil law the guarantee of legal autonomy is of central importance. This is reflected, on the one hand, in the significance of the civil code's (Zivilgesetzbuch; ZGB) guarantees of personality protection, but especially in the constitutive significance of private autonomy for civil law transactions.[19] The protection of personality rights takes precedence wherever the provision of basic equality of the contracting parties mentioned in para. 3 is obviously not given, for example in cases of excessive binding (renunciation of freedom of action, complete or at least immoral self-restraint, Article 27 (2) [ZGB] (https://www.admin.ch /opc/de/classified-compilation/19070042/index.html)) or overreach ("apparent disproportion between performance and consideration", brought about "by exploitation of the plight, inexperience or recklessness of the other"); Article 20 [OR] (https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19110009/index.html)).[20] It is important to note that in dealings between private parties, all sides are protected by their legal personality and the associated personal rights, i.e. private autonomy. Therefore, other factors have to be taken into consideration in determining the weight of each party's position.

[9] In Swiss public law, private autonomy (or at least a largely analogous power of law-making) has an effect where legal leeway must be negotiated within the public procedure. It also finds a democratic expression in the participation of those affected by a decision - especially in the right to be heard - and is typically substantiated in political rights, civil rights, procedural rights the legislative and ordinance level.[21] Due to the lawfulness of the administration, however, personal participation has less scope and as a rule is not weighted as much in individual cases as is the case in civil law constellations. More specifically, in these constellations personal rights come into play only in so far as it lies within the scope of protection of a corresponding fundamental right (see para. 6).

Second factor: the comparability of opposing interests

[10] In the area of civil law, private personal rights are regularly confronted with other legally protected private interests. Between natural persons, the legal assets involved are fundamentally comparable to human dignity because of their common reference. In the field of public law, the right to privacy positioned opposite public interests. Even though the latter sometimes come in the form of fundamental rights of third parties, the comparability of the legal interests is not given in the same way. Due to their different "distance" to human dignity, the two legal positions are constitutionally incommensurable (not directly comparable), which is why a normative, constitutionally supported comparability must first be established.[22]

[11] For the same reason, according to the view held here, the comparability of the legal interests in the context of a civil law relationship is not automatically given if a natural person on the one side faces a legal person on the other. In these cases - as in public law - the individual interests of the natural person are opposed to the collective interests of the legal person. Just as in the case of public interests, the rights of the legal person as a (private) collective interest are not directly grounded in human dignity and therefore do not share the same closeness to personhood.

[12] For the protection of personality rights, the need to establish normative comparability between conflicting interests implies that such interests should be brought into alignment with the fundamental values of the constitution. Therefore, the level of protection should always be determined in relation to the relative "distance" to the legally protected concept of human dignity.

Third factor: The power of disposition concerning legal assets

[13] The state's constitutional legal duty of protecting fundamental rights can also be triggered by constellations in which the persons concerned are not in a position or not legally authorised to dispose of the rights in question. This may be the case for legal reasons when personal rights of a third party are involved[23] or if the participation of the persons concerned circumvents the protection afforded by fundamental rights, i.e. the protection provided by the democratic mechanism of the sufficient legal basis or mandatory provisions of civil law.[24] The function of a sufficient legal basis (public law) as well as the mandatory provisions (civil law) lies in removing certain legal questions from the disposition of the administration or those concerned, e.g. when negotiating the content of a law.[25] For factual reasons, the power of disposition concerning legal interests may be impaired by circumstances or other parties rendering the effective exercise of personal rights considerably more difficult. One should especially think of constellations in which the personal autonomy is undermined by extrinsic factors.[26]

Fourth factor: responsibility for the conflicting legal interest

[14] As early as the middle of the last century, it was pointed out in Swiss legal thought that "even in the extra-state sphere of social life, power can [accumulate] and [...] create relations of factual subordination that jeopardise individual freedom."[27] The legal assessment of such constellations of state-like relationships of subjugation[28] has since been discussed under the heading of the "indirect effect of fundamental rights" (indirekte Drittwirkung). This idea is now enshrined in the constitution under Article 35 (3) [BV] (https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19995395/index.html#a8), obliging the public authorities to ensure that the fundamental rights, as far as they are suitable, are made effective between private persons. It is therefore not the question of if, but in what way the fundamental rights of the Swiss constitution are effective between private persons.[29]

[15] The question of the effect that fundamental rights have between private persons is commonly answered in two variants: direct and indirect third-party effects.

  • Direct third-party effect is accorded to fundamental rights, if private individuals can appeal directly to the constitution in civil lawsuits. A general direct third-party effect of fundamental rights, in the form of a distinct "layer of legal effect" of its own, is predominantly rejected in Switzerland. However, in the sense of an exception Article 8 (3) sentence 3 BV, the Federal Constitution contains a protective provision in favour of women, which can be invoked directly under civil law.

  • An indirect third-party effect is accorded to fundamental rights when they become effective in the context of the application of civil law between private individuals. This limits the scope for the exercise of private autonomy and is the effect required in Art. 35 (3) BV (see para. 17 below). In this constellation, the state authorities remain sole addressees and bear the full responsibility of ensuring the effectiveness of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Swiss constitution.[30]

[16] In order to be able to bring about an indirect legal effect, the protection afforded by the fundamental rights must be translated into civil rights and duties applicable to private legal relations. This means that the values contained within the fundamental rights must be transported during the process of weighing up private interests.[31] The translation thus occurs within the application of mandatory civil law and the associated balance of interests by authorities and courts.

[17] Private parties are not obligated to fulfil any constitutional legal duty of protection, unless they are expressly obliged to do so by the Constitution or by law. They are only bound to the effect of the fundamental rights insofar as the legislature considers this to be meaningful or "suitable" for the enforcement of its duty to protect within the meaning of Art. 35 para. 3 BV. Their responsibility therefore cannot have the effect of a duty to protect the fundamental rights other private persons.

[18] On the contrary, due to the private autonomy of all participants, it assumes the form of a responsibility for the existence of the contract. From the perspective of legal consequences within the scope of civil law, the responsibility of private individuals can be surmised by the fact that legal transactions which violate the legal personality of the other party may be contestable or null and void and may give rise to liability. In the case of legal contestability, the enforcement of personality rights of the injured party lies with that party, which must file a corresponding claim. This is different in cases when the "core" of the personality is infringed. Such a contract is qualified by the Swiss Federal Court as immoral and therefore void. This means that such contracts are void ex tunc (from the beginning) and corresponding legal transactions therefore "have had no legal effect at any time".[32] The obligation of enforcement here lies with the state authorities and not with the injured party - and is mandatory.[33] This relieves the injured party from the obligation of enforcement, and implicitly assumes sole responsibility for the other party.

[19] At the same time, however, the private responsibility for other people's personal rights also manifests itself in the form of a legal quasi ecological responsibility (rechtsökologische Obliegenheit) pertaining to the balance of interests in the context of the equality of legal subjects envisaged by civil law,[34] and thus also for the existence of freedom of contract as a legal institution; a too one-sided, burdensome exercise of one's own rights at the expense of third parties will at one point trigger a reaction of the state institutions within the framework of the duty to protect fundamental rights. Here, the structural relationship to the protection of fundamental rights in the context of public law is very clear.

3. Summary with regard to data protection law

[20] A function shared by both civil and public law norms protecting personality rights is that they restrict the decision-making power of those involved in certain areas of relevance to the personal lives of the affected parties. What is more, in both instances the scope of that restriction is determined by weighing the private and public interests involved. According to the view held here, the legal weight attached to the interests at play in both cases is indicated by the "distance" between the protected legal interest and the core of the respective personality right (equivalent legal capacity in the case of civil law and the constitutional guarantee of human dignity respectively). Finally, one has to consider the question of whether rights (which the parties may or may not legally dispose of) may be restricted by a generally legitimate form of restriction of personal rights of the data subjects (for example, consent to immoral personality impairment). In summary, the following protection parameters are involved in both areas of law:

  • The previous legal response to a latent threat to the personality in the relevant area of law.
  • The comparability or commensurability of the participating personality rights with respect to their relative "distance" to the equivalent legal capacity or private autonomy and over this to the personality rights and finally to the constitutional protection of human dignity.
  • The legal and actual power of disposition of the parties pertaining to the protected personality rights involved.
  • The degree and the legal quality of the responsibility of the parties concerning conflicting interests protected by personality rights.

[21] The freedom of autonomy or privacy conveyed by the fundamental rights are prerequisite for the individual to develop as autonomous human being and to contribute to the common good and take part in the free exchange of ideas, rights and goods as an independent individual. An important function of the indirect third-party effect of fundamental rights is therefore to limit the social, economic and political power of natural and legal persons and to make them compatible with each other. It is in the interest of society, insofar as it does not want to endanger the functionality of the constitutional state, to give substance to fundamental rights also between private parties in a manner that legally and effectively enables their enforcement in the area of civil law.[35]

[22] From this perspective, the core of the constitutional personality rights, as partly embodied, for example, in the content of "immorality" in the sense of Art. 19 para. 2 of the Swiss contract code (Obligationenrecht; OR), is inviolable in the private sphere and its absolute protection is constitutionally secured. From the inviolability follows the nullity of such legal transactions (or vice versa, depending on perspective). Repeated or even systemic violations of the protected area finally trigger the state's duty to protect fundamental rights in the area of civil law, and the subsequent regulations restrict the private autonomy and thus the personal rights of the respective structurally superior legal entities. A respect for the rights of third parties in the sense of the "commandment of consideration" (Gebot der Schonung[36]) by the legal subjects may preempt such constitutionally required interventions and thus prevent an increasing "legalization" of the private sphere. In the sense of a legal quasi-ecological obligation, the private parties of legal transactions under civil law have a certain responsibility[37] pertaining to the effectiveness of the privacy rights of third parties.

[23] In the area of Swiss data protection law, for example, this approach is reflected in the fact that parties with information or power advantages that can be used to significantly restrict the other party's personal rights (such as through the use of terms and conditions) do well (a) to inform the other party in a manner that reduces the information gap to an acceptable level and (b) to respect the legal personality of the other parties in a manner that creates an agreement of equitable balance. Failure to comply with this obligation may trigger a recommendation by the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection (EDOEB)[38] or result in the adoption of protective standards. As of 25 May 2018, with the coming into force of the GDPR, failure to comply in legal relationships with effects in the EU may result in penalties in the form of fines.[39]


Foto originally by unsplash-logoPeng Chen


  1. OFK-Biaggini, Art. 35 BV, para. 2 and 21. ↩︎

  2. Jörg Paul Müller, Die Grundrechte der Verfassung und der Persönlichkeitsschutz des Privatrechts, Abhandlungen zum schweizerischen Recht ASR, Heft 360, Bern 1964, p. 85 ff. ↩︎

  3. See Jörg Paul Müller, Die Grundrechte der Verfassung und der Persönlichkeitsschutz des Privatrechts, Abhandlungen zum schweizerischen Recht ASR, Heft 360, Bern 1964, p. 151 ff. m.w.H.; ebenso Peter Saladin, Grundrechte im Wandel - Die Rechtsprechung des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts zu den Grundrechten in einer sich ändernden Umwelt, Bern 1970, p. 108; "[...] der durch Art. 27/28 ZGB und Art. 49 OR gewährleistete Persönlichkeitsschutz deckt sich in seiner Zielsetzung mit der verfassungsmässigen Garantie persönlicher Freiheit in ihrem weiten Sinn". ↩︎

  4. BSK ZGB I - Andreas Meili, Art. 28 ZGB N 5; Regina E. Aebi-Müller, II. Personenrecht /Die "Persönlichkeit" im Sinne von Art. 28 ZGB, in: Thomas Geiser/ Thomas Koller/ Ruth Reusser/ Hans Peter Walter/ Wolfgang Wiegand (Hrsg.), Privatrecht im Spannungsfeld zwischen gesellschaftlichem Wandel und ethischer Verantwortung, Festschrift für Heinz Hausheer zum 65. Geburtstag, - Beiträge zum Familienrecht, Erbrecht, Persönlichkeitsrecht, Haftpflichtrecht, Medizinalrecht und allgemeinen Privatrecht, Bern 2002, p. 101f.; Peter Saladin, Grundrechte im Wandel - Die Rechtsprechung des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts zu den Grundrechten in einer sich ändernden Umwelt, Bern 1970, p. 107; "Die persönliche Freiheit - im Sinne der körperlichen Integrität und Bewegungsfreiheit wie in dem einer Garantie menschlicher Würde - wird im Verhältnis unter Privaten allgemein durch Art. 27/28 ZGB gewährleistet". ↩︎

  5. For clarification of the legal term see OFK-Biaggini, Art. 35 BV, Rz. 4; for historical development Jörg Paul Müller, Die Grundrechte der Verfassung und der Persönlichkeitsschutz des Privatrechts, Abhandlungen zum schweizerischen Recht ASR, Heft 360, Bern 1964, p. 163 ff. ↩︎

  6. Regina E. Aebi-Müller, II. Personenrecht /Die "Persönlichkeit" im Sinne von Art. 28 ZGB, in: Thomas Geiser/ Thomas Koller/ Ruth Reusser/ Hans Peter Walter/ Wolfgang Wiegand (Hrsg.), Privatrecht im Spannungsfeld zwischen gesellschaftlichem Wandel und ethischer Verantwortung, Festschrift für Heinz Hausheer zum 65. Geburtstag, - Beiträge zum Familienrecht, Erbrecht, Persönlichkeitsrecht, Haftpflichtrecht, Medizinalrecht und allgemeinen Privatrecht, Bern 2002, S. 113 ff. ↩︎

  7. For clarifications on the forum internum as the core of absolute privacy protection see Philip Glass, Die Rechtsstaatliche Bearbeitung von Personendaten in der Schweiz, Diss. Basel, Zürich /St. Gallen 2017, p. 172 ff. m.w.H.; For the description as "absolutely protected core area of "private life" in German law see the judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court concerning the guarantee of the confidentiality and integrity of information-technical systems in BverfGE 120, 274, para. 270 ff. ↩︎

  8. Eugen Huber, Erläuterungen zum Vorentwurf eines schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuches, Zweite, durch Verweisungen auf das Zivilgesetzbuch und etliche Beilagen ergänzte Auflage, Bern 1914, p. 48 (translation by the author). ↩︎

  9. See CHK-Aebi- Müller, Art. 1-456 ZGB, Art. 28 ZGB, Rz. 10-28; BSK ZGB I - Andreas Meili, Art. 28 N 17; a similar (if shorter) list can already be found in Eugen Huber, Erläuterungen zum Vorentwurf eines schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuches, Zweite, durch Verweisungen auf das Zivilgesetzbuch und etliche Beilagen ergänzte Auflage, Bern 1914, p. 48 ff.; i.e. differences of gender, confession, status and profession as well as questions pertaining to the concept of honour. ↩︎

  10. Jean Nicolas Druey, Der Kodex des Gesprächs - Was die Sprechaktlehre dem Juristen zu sagen hat, Baden-Baden 2015, p. 243. ↩︎

  11. For the legal weighting of rights by connection to legal norms with a particularly high democratic and constitutional legitimacy see Philip Glass, Die Rechtsstaatliche Bearbeitung von Personendaten in der Schweiz, Diss. Basel, Zürich /St. Gallen 2017, p. 84 f. ↩︎

  12. Concerning the public interest perteining to individual autonomy see Philip Glass, Die Rechtsstaatliche Bearbeitung von Personendaten in der Schweiz, Diss. Basel, Zürich /St. Gallen 2017, p. 171 ff.; see also para. 13. ↩︎

  13. See Eva Maria Belser, Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit im Vertragsrecht, Diss. Univ. Fribourg 2000, p. 55 ff. ↩︎

  14. On the importance of the constitutional guarantee of human dignity see OFK-Biaggini, Art. 7 BV, Rz. 4 ff. m.w.H. ↩︎

  15. On the legal effect of the right to human dignity between private individuals see Philippe Mastronardi, St. Galler Kommentar, Art. 7 BV, Rz. 36. ↩︎

  16. For clarification of the legal term see Jörg Paul Müller/ Markus Schefer, Grundrechte in der Schweiz, 4. Auflage, Bern 2008, p. 40 m.w.H. ↩︎

  17. See Jörg Paul Müller/ Markus Schefer, Grundrechte in der Schweiz, 4. Auflage, Bern 2008, p. 43; Rainer J. Schweizer, St. Galler Kommentar, Art. 10 BV, Rz. 7 ff. ↩︎

  18. On the importance for the development of fundamental rights in Switzerland see Jörg Paul Müller, Allgemeine Bemerkungen zu den Grundrechten, in: Daniel Thürer/ Jean-François Aubert/ Jörg Paul Müller (Hrsg.) unter Mitarb. von Oliver Diggelmann, Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz - Droit constitutionnel suisse, Zürich 2001, p. 625; René Rhinow/ Markus Schefer/ Peter Uebersax, Schweizerisches Verfassungsrecht, 3., erweiterte und aktualisierte Auflage, Basel 2016, No. 956; concerning the development in Swiss civil law see Heinz Hausheer/ Regina E. Aebi-Müller, Das Personenrecht des Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuches, 4. Auflage, Bern 2016, No. 10.11 f. ↩︎

  19. See Eva Maria Belser, Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit im Vertragsrecht, Diss. Univ. Fribourg 2000, p. 50 f. ↩︎

  20. Concerning the relationship between the two provisions see BSK ZGB I - Claire Huguenin /Christophe Peter Reitze, Art. 27 N 8 f. ↩︎

  21. A typical example of this is the principle of individualization, as used in the assessment of individual needs in the context of social assistance; see Guido Wizent, Die sozialhilferechtliche Bedürftigkeit – ein Handbuch, Basel/St. Gallen 2014, p. 251 ff.; Iris Schaller Schenk, Das Individualisierungsprinzip - Bedeutung in der Sozialhilfe aus verfassungs- und verwaltungsrechtlicher Perspektive, Zürich/St.Gallen 2016, passim; Philip Glass, Die Rechtsstaatliche Bearbeitung von Personendaten in der Schweiz, Diss. Basel, Zürich /St. Gallen 2017, p. 41 ff. ↩︎

  22. See Philip Glass, Die Rechtsstaatliche Bearbeitung von Personendaten in der Schweiz, Diss. Basel, Zürich /St. Gallen 2017, p. 64 ff. ↩︎

  23. See Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen für und regulative Herausforderungen durch Big Data, in: Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem (Hrsg.), Big Data - Regulative Herausforderungen, Baden-Baden 2018, p. 42. ↩︎

  24. For example, in the case of consent to the processing of personal data for as a replacement for a missing legal basis; in detail Philip Glass, Die Rechtsstaatliche Bearbeitung von Personendaten in der Schweiz, Diss. Basel, Zürich /St. Gallen 2017, p. 235 f. ↩︎

  25. On the principle that in the context of the conclusion of administrative contracts the private party can not consent to any promises for which there is no legal basis, see Pierre Tschannen/ Ulrich Zimmerli/ Markus Müller, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, 4. Auflage, Bern 2014, p. 352.; concerning the problem in the context of the consent to the processing of special personal data see Philip Glass, Die rechtsstaatliche Bearbeitung von Personendaten in der Schweiz, p. 228 ff. ↩︎

  26. BSK ZGB I - Claire Huguenin /Christophe Peter Reitze, Art. 27 N 10 ff. ↩︎

  27. Jörg Paul Müller, Die Grundrechte der Verfassung und der Persönlichkeitsschutz des Privatrechts, Abhandlungen zum schweizerischen Recht ASR, Heft 360, Bern 1964, p. 22 f.; concerning the then burgeoning discussion on third-party effects of fundamental rights see p. 161 ff. ↩︎

  28. OFK-Biaggini, Art. 35 BV, No. 21. ↩︎

  29. OFK-Biaggini, Art. 8 BV No. 33. ↩︎

  30. Zum ganzen OFK-Biaggini, Art. 35 BV, No. 18. ↩︎

  31. See Philip Glass, Die Rechtsstaatliche Bearbeitung von Personendaten in der Schweiz, Diss. Basel, Zürich /St. Gallen 2017, p. 85. ↩︎

  32. Eva Maria Belser, Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit im Vertragsrecht, Diss. Fribourg 2000, S. 439 f. ↩︎

  33. Eva Maria Belser, Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit im Vertragsrecht, Diss. Fribourg 2000, p. 440 f.; BSK ZGB I - Claire Huguenin /Christophe Peter Reitze, Art. 27 N 18 ff., promoting a flexible concept of nullity whose legal consequences would be determined by the purpose of the infringed protection standard (N 21). ↩︎

  34. Concerning the legal quasi-ecological view see Jean Nicolas Druey, Der Kodex des Gesprächs - Was die Sprechaktlehre dem Juristen zu sagen hat, Baden-Baden 2015, p. 401 f.; "Rückwirkungen erfordern die Selbstbeschränkung in der Beanspruchung der Welt im Sinne eines Selbstschutzes" (p.401). ↩︎

  35. Philip Glass, Die Rechtsstaatliche Bearbeitung von Personendaten in der Schweiz, Diss. Basel, Zürich /St. Gallen 2017, p. 171 ff. m.w.H. ↩︎

  36. Jean Nicolas Druey, Der Kodex des Gesprächs - Was die Sprechaktlehre dem Juristen zu sagen hat, Baden-Baden 2015, p. 402; "Massgebender Gesichtspunkt ist die Symbiose selber, die Erhaltung des Partners". ↩︎

  37. Or even a moral obligation, as postulated by the Franciscan monk Luca Pacioli in the late 15th century for double-entry bookkeeping; see (including a short overview concerning blockchains and confidence building) Michael J. Casey /Paul Vigna, In Blockchain we Trust, Technology Review, Vol. 121 No. 3 May/June 2018, p. 12. ↩︎

  38. According to Art. 29 of the Federal Data Protection Act (Datenschutzgesetz, DSG), the Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner is authorized to investigate suspected systemic errors and to make recommendations regarding the investigated instances of data processing. The Commissioner is also authorized to refer his recommendations to the Federal Supreme Court; see for example BGE 136 II 508 (Logistep). ↩︎

  39. See the information page of the Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner concerning the GDPR and its impact on Switzerland (in German language). ↩︎